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INTRODUCTION
Section 107 of the Internal Revenue Code excludes from gross income the value of in-kind housing and cash parsonage allowances provided to “minister[s] of the gospel.” 1 During the course of the celebrated
Warren litigation, 2 several commentators (including me 3) predicted
that, if that litigation were dismissed, a subsequent challenge would
eventually be mounted to the constitutionality of Section 107. This prediction has come to fruition. Warren was dismissed in 2002 and now, in
Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Geithner, 4 the Freedom from Religion Foundation (FFRF), for itself and its members, argues that Section
107 and the income tax exclusion that section grants to “minister[s] of
the gospel” violate the Establishment Clause 5 of the First Amendment. 6
However, we did not predict that, when the constitutionality of
Section 107 was again questioned in court, the case would have implications for a new federal law mandating that individuals maintain “minimum essential” health care coverage for themselves and their dependents. 7 The individual health care mandate established by the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 8 and the Health Care and
I.R.C. § 107 (2006).
Warren v. Comm’r, 302 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissing appeal after stipulations by
parties); Warren v. Comm’r, 282 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (appointing amicus curiae and
requesting supplemental briefing); Warren v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 343 (2000). For a discussion of
the Warren controversy, see John R. Dorocak, The Income Tax Exclusion of the Housing Allowance for Ministers of the Gospel Per I.R.C. Section 107: First Amendment Establishment of Religion or Free Exercise Thereof—Where Should the Warren Court Have Gone?, 54 SAN DIEGO. L.
REV. 233 (2009).
3 The commentary on Warren was voluminous. For my contribution to the Warren oeuvre, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Dr. Warren, Section 107 and the Court-Appointed Amicus, 96 TAX
NOTES 1267 (2002); Edward A. Zelinsky, Dr. Warren, Section 107, and Texas Monthly: A Reply,
95 TAX NOTES 1663 (2002), reprinted in 37 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 33 (2002); Edward A.
Zelinsky, Dr. Warren, The Parsonage Exclusion, and the First Amendment, 95 TAX NOTES 115
(2002), reprinted in 36 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 185 (2002).
4 715 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (E.D. Cal. 2010); see also Freedom from Religion Found. v.
Geithner, 644 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming in part and reversing in part with respect to
clergyman’s motion to intervene).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”).
6 The FFRF complaint also challenges the constitutionality of I.R.C. § 265(a)(6) and the
constitutionality of CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17131.6 (West 2012) which, with modification,
incorporates the parsonage allowance into the California income tax. Complaint ¶¶ 32–40,
Freedom from Religion Found. v. Geithner, 262 F.R.D. 527 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CIV. 09-2894
WBS DAD).
7 I.R.C. § 5000A (West 2012); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, The Health-Related Tax Provisions of PPACA and HCERA: Contingent, Complex, Incremental and Lacking Cost Controls
§ 7.02[6], in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1633556.
8 Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b), 10106(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 244, 909 (2010).
1
2
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Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) of 2010 9 contains two religious
exemptions. 10 One of these exemptions incorporates a pre-existing religious exemption from the federal self-employment tax. 11 These sectarian exemptions raise the same First Amendment issues as does the
Code’s exclusion of clerical housing from gross income. In First
Amendment terms, Section 107, the federal health mandate’s religious
exemptions, and the religious exemptions from the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA) and the self-employment taxes raise the possibilities of unconstitutional subsidization of religion and of excessive
entanglement between church and state.
I write to evaluate the claim that Section 107 is unconstitutional
because of the entanglement it causes and to explore the implications of
that claim for the religious exemptions from the new federal health care
mandate, as well as the religious exemptions from the taxes financing
Social Security. While the constitutionality vel non of the new health
care mandate has been controversial, 12 commentators have largely ignored the issue of the constitutionality of the health mandate’s two religious exemptions.
I ultimately reject the indictment of Section 107 as impermissibly
entangling church and state. For the same reasons, I also conclude that
the religious exemptions of the Social Security taxes and of the individual health mandate pass First Amendment muster. Extensive contact
between modern tax systems and religious institutions is unavoidable.
Whether religious entities and actors are taxed or exempted, there are
no disentangling alternatives, just imperfect trade-offs between different
forms of entanglement.
If religious institutions and actors are taxed, they are subjected to
the inherently intrusive relationship between the tax collector and the
taxpayer. If religious institutions and actors are not taxed, there are inevitable tensions policing the borderlines of exemption. In the contemporary tax context, there is no way to prevent significant entanglement
between mega-churches and mega-governments. Rather, the inevitable
choice is between borderline entanglement and enforcement entanglement.

Pub. L. No. 111-152, §§ 1002, 1004, 124 Stat. 1029, 1032, 1034 (2010).
I.R.C. § 5000A(d)(2) (West 2012).
11 Id. § 1402(g) (West 2012).
12 Compare Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011), with Florida
ex rel Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted 132 S. Ct 604 (2011); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS TO
OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, at R40725 (2010), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40725_ 20090724.pdf. The CRS has discussed the constitutional issues surrounding the religious exemptions of the individual health care mandate. Id. at 20–
25.
9

10
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Section 107 and the exclusion from gross income it grants to clerical recipients of housing and parsonage allowances are constitutionally
permitted, though not constitutionally required, 13 responses to the alternative forms of entanglement inherent in the relationship between
modern government and religion. Similarly, the Code’s sectarian exemptions from the individual health care mandate and from the FICA
and self-employment taxes are acceptable, though not obligatory, means
under the First Amendment of managing the inevitable contacts and
tensions between the contemporary state and the religious community.
Through these exemptions, Congress plausibly chooses entanglement
between church and state at the borders of exemption rather than the
entanglement of enforcing tax laws against religious entities and their
personnel. Entanglement between church and state is inevitable whether
the modern tax law exempts or taxes sectarian institutions and actors.
This reality undermines the characterization of Section 107 and other
tax exemptions as subsidies of religion since there is a credible, nonsubsidizing rationale for each of these Code provisions, i.e., the management of tax-related entanglement between church and state, given
the inexorable and imperfect trade-off between enforcement entanglement and borderline entanglement.
However, that a particular tax exemption is constitutionally permitted does not mean that it is a good idea in terms of tax policy. As a
matter of such policy, the exclusion of Section 107(2) for cash parsonage
allowances stands on weaker ground than does the exclusion of Section
107(1) for in-kind housing provided to “minister[s] of the gospel.” The
church-state entanglement inherent in taxing noncash income is particularly acute in light of the valuation and liquidity problems of taxing
such noncash income. In contrast, the taxation of cash parsonage allowances, unlike the taxation of housing provided in-kind, does not involve
quandaries of valuation or of taxpayer liquidity and is thus less entangling as a constitutional matter and more practicable as a matter of tax
policy.
The advisability of the parsonage allowance has recently come into
particular focus as a result of three developments: the investigation of
“media-based ministries” by the staff of Senator Grassley, former rank-

13 I leave for another day the interesting issue whether the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (RFRA) would require these exemptions even if the Constitution does not. While
the Supreme Court has declared RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states and their municipalities, it remains in effect as to the federal government itself. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4 (2006)); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (holding that RFRA “exceeds Congress’ power” under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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ing member of the Senate Finance Committee; 14 the subsequent announcement of the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability
(ECFA) that, in response to Senator Grassley’s concerns, it has established a Commission on Accountability and Policy for Religious Organizations to consider, among other issues, “whether legislation is needed
to curb abuses of the clergy housing allowance exclusion”; 15 and the
decision by the closely-divided U.S. Tax Court that the parsonage allowance may be awarded to a “minister of the gospel” for more than one
home. 16 Out of these developments have emerged proposals for a dollar
cap on the parsonage allowance exclusion and the limitation of the allowance to a minister’s single residence. 17 However, the allowance, paid
in cash, should, as a matter of tax policy, be jettisoned altogether. While
the allowance is constitutional as a plausible choice to avoid enforcement entanglement by accepting borderline entanglement, the cash
nature of such allowances suggests that such allowances should be taxed
along with other clerical compensation paid in cash. In First Amendment terms, taxing cash compensation, while it enmeshes church and
state, enmeshes them less than taxing in-kind income.
The first five parts of this Article establish the background for my
analysis. The first part describes the Supreme Court’s Establishment
Clause decisions concerning religious entanglement. These cases highlight the inevitable choice between borderline entanglement and enforcement entanglement. The second part of this Article outlines Code
Section 107, which excludes from ministers’ gross incomes housing and
housing allowances, and Code Section 119, which more generally excludes from employees’ incomes certain employer-provided housing.
The third part of this Article explores the religious exemptions from the
two taxes which finance Social Security benefits, the FICA tax on wages,
and the federal self-employment tax. The fourth part of this Article discusses the religious exemptions of the new federal health insurance
mandate on individuals while the fifth part describes the Warren litigation and FFRF’s complaint against Section 107.

14 Memorandum from Theresa Pattera & Sean Barnet to Senator Grassley on Review of
Media-Based Ministries (Jan. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Grassley Staff Memo], available at http://
finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/download/?id=1f92d378-baa2-440d-9fbd-333cdc5d85fc.
15 ECFA to Lead Independent Commission on Major Accountability and Policy Issues for
Churches and Other Religious Organization, ECFA.ORG (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.ecfa.org/
Content/ECFA-to-Lead-Independent-Commission-on-Major-Accountability-and-PolicyIssues-for-Churches-and-Other-Religious-Organizations.
16 Driscoll v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 557 (2010), rev’d, No. 11-12454, 2012 WL 384834 (11th Cir.
Feb. 8, 2012); see also Laura Saunders, Tax Relief for Clergy Is Questioned, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 23,
2011, at C1.
17 Grassley Staff Memo, supra note 14, at 15 (noting that among “issues for consideration”
are “[s]hould the parsonage allowance be limited to a single primary residence or to a specific
dollar amount?”).
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Against this background, the sixth part of this Article concludes
that Section 107 is not a tax “subsidy” because it serves a nonsubsidizing
purpose, i.e., the management of tax-related entanglement between
church and state by eschewing enforcement entanglement at the price of
borderline entanglement. The seventh part of this Article contends that
invalidating Section 107 will not reduce church-state entanglement, but
will merely shift the nature of such entanglement from policing the borderlines of exemption to the enforcement of housing-related income tax
against religious employers and individuals. The entanglement problems of taxing noncash income, such as housing provided to clerical
employees, are particularly acute given the valuation and liquidation
quandaries of taxing in-kind income. These problems reinforce the decision embodied in Section 107 to opt for the difficulties of borderline
entanglement over the costs of enforcement entanglement. The eighth
part of this Article places the discussion in the context of Section 119
and highlights the extent to which repealing Section 107 would, in significant measure, refocus the tax law upon the enmeshing questions
involved in determining the boundaries of Section 119. The ninth part
of this Article rejects the possibility of holding Section 107 unconstitutional while simultaneously forbidding Section 119’s exclusion to religious employers and their employees. Among its other defects, this approach would entangle the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and religious
entities in determining which employers are religious and therefore
barred from Section 119. There is, moreover, a serious problem under
the Free Exercise Clause if only religious employers and their workers
are precluded from Section 119 and its income tax exclusion of employer-provided housing.
The tenth part of this Article concludes that, while Section 107 is
constitutional as a permissible approach to managing entanglement
between the IRS and religious entities and their ministers, Section
107(2) is not persuasive as a matter of tax policy. The recipients of cash
parsonage allowances have liquidity to pay income tax; there are no
valuation problems taxing cash. Hence, as a matter of tax policy, parsonage allowances should be taxed. In First Amendment terms, taxing
cash compensation does not enmesh church and state as severely as
would the taxation of clerical housing provided in-kind. The repeal of
Section 107(2) is preferable to the alternatives of capping the dollar
amount of the parsonage allowance or limiting the allowance to a single
clerical home.
The eleventh part of this Article concludes that, just as Section 107
is constitutional as a permissible means of managing the inevitable
church-state entanglement trade-offs under the modern income tax, the
religious exemptions under the individual health mandate, the FICA
tax, and the self-employment tax are all constitutionally permitted,
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though not constitutionally required. In these contexts also, the inevitable choice is between the problems of borderline entanglement and the
quandaries of enforcement entanglement. Through these tax exemptions, Congress has reasonably and constitutionally opted to avoid the
difficulties of enforcing the tax law against religious actors and institutions by accepting the problems of policing the borders of tax exemption for such actors and institutions.
The final part of this Article briefly places my conclusions into the
context of controversy over the three-part Lemon test 18 and the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
and School v. EEOC. 19 One of the three elements of the Lemon First
Amendment test is entanglement. Whatever the value in other settings
of the concept of entanglement, that concept is of limited (typically no)
use in assessing the First Amendment status of tax laws since, given the
realities of modern tax systems, there are no disentangling alternatives.
In the tax context, the only choices are to tax sectarian institutions and
actors (and thus incur the problems of enforcement entanglement) or to
exempt such institutions and actors (and thus experience the problems
of borderline entanglement).
While the constitutionality vel non of Section 107 is important in
and of itself, more is at stake in Freedom from Religion Foundation than
the First Amendment status of the federal income tax exclusion for clerical housing and parsonage allowances. The ultimate issue raised by this
litigation is whether federal, state and local tax statutes can, consistent
with the First Amendment, contain religious exemptions. If Section 107
unconstitutionally entangles church and state as FFRF argues, so too do
the statutory exemptions from the new federal health care mandate as
do the sectarian exemptions from the Social Security taxes. By the same
token, if Section 107 passes First Amendment muster (as I conclude it
does), the religious exemptions of the individual health care mandate
and of the self-employment and FICA taxes are likewise constitutional.
These exemptions permissibly implement the plausible (though not
compelled) choice to incur the problems of borderline enforcement
rather than the difficulties of enforcement entanglement, a reasonable
choice in a world of imperfect trade-offs between entangling alternatives. Whether the government chooses to tax religious actors and institutions or to exempt them, there are no disentangling alternatives.

18
19

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
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I. THE SUPREME COURT’S ENTANGLEMENT DECISIONS: BORDERLINE
ENTANGLEMENT V. ENFORCEMENT ENTANGLEMENT
The history of contemporary 20 First Amendment entanglement law
starts with Walz v. Tax Commission. 21 The majority opinion in Walz
focused on enforcement entanglement, the intrusion into internal
church operations which results when the church is taxed and upon the
protection of religious institutions’ autonomy when those institutions
are excluded from the tax base. Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Walz
highlights the borderline entanglement stemming from religious exemptions, the entanglement which flows from the need to define and
police the boundaries of such exemptions. These two opinions—the first
focusing upon sectarian autonomy, the second concentrating on borderline enforcement—illustrate the entanglement concerns at play when
analyzing the constitutionality of Section 107 and the religious exemptions of the individual health care mandate and of the self-employment
and FICA taxes.
In Walz, an owner of taxable real property mounted a First
Amendment challenge to New York’s property tax exemption for “real
or personal property used exclusively for religious . . . purposes.” 22 In a
majority opinion for himself and five of his colleagues, Chief Justice
Burger declared such exemption constitutional as reflecting “a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without
sponsorship and without interference.” 23 Chief Justice Burger placed the
tax exemption for religious property in the context of the exemptions
simultaneously extended to “a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasipublic corporations which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups.” 24 He
also observed that the purpose of New York’s “property tax exemption
is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion.” 25 Rather,
New York “has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as ben-

20 The Supreme Court’s earlier opinions in Murdock and Follett suggest that, under certain
circumstances, the First Amendment sometimes compels tax exemption for religious activity.
See Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943). However, these decisions play little role in the Court’s contemporary First Amendment
doctrine which views sectarian tax exemptions as permitted rather than compelled. Edward A.
Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” for Religious Institutions Constitutionally Dependent on Benefits for
Secular Entities?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 805, 830 (2001).
21 397 U.S. 664 (1970). For more on Walz, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits”
Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379, 392–95 (1998).
22 Id. at 666–67 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1).
23 Id. at 669.
24 Id. at 672–73.
25 Id. at 672.
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eficial and stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest.” 26
Moreover, while tax exemption yields “an indirect economic benefit” to the exempted religious institutions, such exemption also minimizes “entanglement” between the government and those institutions.27
The tax exemption of church property, wrote Chief Justice Burger, recognizes “the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies” 28 and “creates
only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state and
far less than taxation of churches. It restricts the fiscal relationship between church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the
desired separation insulating each from the other.” 29
Concurring, Justice Brennan justified the tax exemption of churches under the First Amendment because of the “nonreligious” benefits
churches provide to the community as part of “a range of other private,
nonprofit organizations.” 30 Echoing Chief Justice Burger’s concern
about possible entanglement between churches and the tax collector,
Justice Brennan also declared that tax exemptions, in contrast to cash
subsidies, “constitute mere passive state involvement with religion and
not the affirmative involvement characteristic of outright governmental
subsidy.” 31 Taxing churches, no less than exempting them, “involve[s]
[the government] with religion.”32
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan, like his colleagues, noted the
“broad and divergent groups” 33 covered by New York’s property tax
exemption. Since that exemption is “so sweeping,” Justice Harlan wrote,
the exemption’s “administration need not entangle government in difficult classifications of what is or is not religious.” 34
While both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Harlan applied to their
respective concerns the “entanglement” moniker, they raised different
considerations. Chief Justice Burger’s entanglement concerns are enforcement-related, focused on the internal “autonomy” of religious institutions. Taxation is inherently intrusive, as anyone who has undergone a tax audit understands. 35 Exempting religious institutions and
their personnel from taxation “separat[es]” and “insulat[es]” govern-

Id. at 673.
Id. at 674–76.
28 Id. at 672.
29 Id. at 675.
30 Id. at 687–88.
31 Id. at 691.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 696.
34 Id. at 698.
35 Professors Crimm and Winer agree. NINA J. CRIMM & LAWRENCE H. WINER, POLITICS,
TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 176 (2011) (“Anyone
who has been subject to an IRS audit appreciates how intrusive it can be.”).
26
27
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ment and sectarian institutions from each other, thereby respecting the
internal autonomy of such institutions. 36
Justice Harlan, by contrast, focused on the entanglement problems
at the borderlines of exemption. The breadth of the New York property
tax exemption reassured Justice Harlan that those problems were manageable in Walz. However, Justice Harlan’s analysis suggests that a narrower tax exemption than New York’s might fail First Amendment
scrutiny as requiring excessively intrusive activity to police the exemption’s boundaries.
One year after Walz, that decision’s “excessive entanglement”
standard became one of the three components 37 of the famous Lemon
test. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 38 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Burger, struck on First Amendment grounds Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island statutes channeling financial assistance to nonpublic
education. In particular, the Court declared that the statutes “involve[d]
excessive entanglement between government and religion.”39 While the
funds given by these states to religious schools were restricted to secular
subjects, “[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are
obeyed. . . . These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church.” 40 This is the same entanglement concern that the Chief Justice expressed in Walz, namely,
the enforcement-related intrusion of the government into internal
church autonomy as the government administers the law. In Lemon, the
laws in question unconstitutionally impaired sectarian autonomy by
requiring the states to audit religious schools to determine such schools’
compliance with the restrictions on the government funds the religious
schools received.
Lemon also invoked as an entanglement problem the possibility of
political divisiveness along sectarian lines: “Here we are confronted with
successive and very likely permanent annual appropriations that benefit
relatively few religious groups. Political fragmentation and divisiveness
on religious lines are thus likely to be intensified.”41
Chief Justice Burger distinguished in two ways the Rhode Island
and Pennsylvania statutes stricken in Lemon from the New York property tax exemption upheld in Walz. The former required regular, annual
Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.
The other two elements of the Lemon test are intent and effect. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.2.3 (3d ed. 2006); RONALD D. ROTUNDA
& JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
§ 21.4(a)(v) (4th ed. 2008).
38 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
39 Id. at 614.
40 Id. at 619.
41 Id. at 623.
36
37
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appropriations of public monies and thus heightened the danger of sectarian political conflict. 42 Moreover, the property tax exemption for
churches has a long tradition. 43 This history suggested to the Chief Justice that such exemption carries less potential for sectarian political division than the new statutes recently adopted by the Ocean and Keystone
states. These two factors—history and annual appropriations—indicate
that the entanglement caused by Section 107 is not excessive. These factors are also at play when analyzing the constitutionality of the religious
exemptions of the individual health care mandate and of the Social Security taxes. In addition, Lemon’s concern about ongoing administrative
entanglement between church and state cautions against taxing religious
institutions since taxation invariably involves continuing enforcement
activity by the tax collector and continuing compliance activity by the
religious taxpayer.
The Burger and Harlan opinions in Walz identified the major
themes that reappeared in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock 44 when the
Court addressed the First Amendment status of Texas’s sales tax exemption for religious literature: the economic value of tax exemption, the
purpose for and effect of such exemption, the dangers of entangling the
tax collector and religious actors. In Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan,
writing for a three-justice plurality, struck the Texas sales tax exemption
because it was limited to sales of religious publications.
The facts in Texas Monthly were as straightforward as they were in
Walz: For a three year period, Texas imposed sales and use taxes on the
sale of secular publications like Texas Monthly magazine while exempting from such taxes the sale of religious periodicals and books. 45 Texas
Monthly, Inc., the publisher of Texas Monthly, collected and paid the
taxes and then sued for a refund, claiming that the exemption for sales
of religious publications violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
For himself, as well as Justices Marshall and Stevens, Justice Brennan interpreted Walz as upholding the New York property tax exemption for churches only because the benefits of such exemption “flowed
to a large number of nonreligious groups as well.” 46 Equally critical for
Justice Brennan was the proposition that “[e]very tax exemption constitutes a subsidy.” 47 Since exemption is subsidization, such subsidization
cannot, consistent with the Establishment Clause, be directed “exclusively to religious organizations.” 48
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 622.
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
489 U.S. 1 (1989).
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
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As to the entanglement considerations so prominent in Walz, Justice Brennan opined in Texas Monthly that the Texas sales tax exemption for religious periodicals “produce[s] greater state entanglement
with religion than the denial of an exemption”49 since the state must
determine which publications are religious and thus qualify for sales tax
exemption. This is Justice Harlan’s borderline version of entanglement,
the concern that a narrowly drawn exemption restricted to religious
institutions engenders conflict as institutions seek to qualify for the exemption. The state must police the boundaries of the exemption and
determine which entities qualify for it.
The fourth and fifth votes 50 in Texas Monthly came from Justices
Blackmun and O’Connor who concurred separately. Concluding that
“[t]he Free Exercise Clause suggests that a special exemption for religious books is required” while “[t]he Establishment Clause suggests that
a special exemption for religious books is forbidden,” 51 Justice
Blackmun proposed the “narrow resolution” of Texas Monthly: “[B]y
confining the tax exemption exclusively to the sale of religious publications, Texas engaged in preferential support for the communication of
religious messages.”52 Such “preference for the dissemination of religious ideas offends our most basic understanding of what the Establishment Clause is all about.” 53
In a blistering dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy, Justice Scalia found Walz “utterly dispositive” of Texas
Monthly’s First Amendment challenge to the Texas sales tax exemption
for sales of religious literature. 54 Effectively dismissing as dicta Walz’s
discussion of the exemption New York simultaneously extended to
secular eleemosynary institutions in Walz, Justice Scalia opined, “[t]he
Court did not approve an exemption for charities that happened to benefit religion; it approved an exemption for religion as an exemption for
religion.” 55
The First Amendment “principle of permissible accommodation”56
permits exemptions limited to religious actors to preclude enforcementrelated entanglement of church and state: “[I]t is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the
ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious
Id. at 20.
Justice White expressed no opinion on the Establishment Clause question, finding the
Texas sales tax exemption a content-based exemption, barred by the Press Clause of the First
Amendment. Id. at 26.
51 Id. at 27.
52 Id. at 28.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 36.
55 Id. at 38.
56 Id. at 39.
49
50
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missions.”57 Such entanglement-avoiding exemptions, Justice Scalia
argued, may “single[] out religious entities for a benefit, rather than
benefiting a broad grouping of which religious organizations are only a
part.” 58
In Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan declared that the Texas sales tax
exemption “appears, on its face, to produce greater state entanglement
with religion than the denial of an exemption.”59 In Walz, Chief Justice
Burger advanced the opposite claim, that tax exemption “creates only a
minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less
than taxation of churches.” 60 At one level, these seemingly contradictory
assertions can be reconciled by the nature of the specific taxes each justice confronted. Because of valuation disputes 61 and liquidity concerns,
ad valorem property taxation (like the taxation of in-kind fringe benefits) arguably is more entangling than is sales taxation, aimed at cash
transactions.
At another level, however, there is no easily applied metric for determining whether policing tax exemption borderlines generates greater
entanglement between church and state than does taxing sectarian institutions and actors. Thus, the tension between Chief Justice Burger’s
Walz opinion and Justice Brennan’s opinion in Texas Monthly highlights the reality that, in the context of tax exemptions for religious institutions and actors, there are no disentangling alternatives. There is only
the choice between borderline entanglement and enforcement entanglement.
II. CODE SECTIONS 107 AND 119
Section 107 62 excludes from the gross income of a “minister of the
gospel”
(1) the rental value of a home furnished to him as part of his compensation; or
(2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation, to
the extent used by him to rent or provide a home and to the extent
57 Id. (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)).
58 Id. (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 483 U.S. at 333).
59 Id. at 20.
60 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
61 On the myriad valuation disputes which arise under systems of ad valorem property
taxation, see WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 802 (9th ed. 2009); JOAN YOUNGMAN, LEGAL ISSUES IN PROPERTY VALUATION AND TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 33 (2006).
62 I.R.C. § 107 (2006).
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such allowance does not exceed the fair rental value of the home, including furnishings and appurtenances such as a garage, plus the cost
of utilities.

Cash payments excluded from a clergyman’s gross income pursuant to Section 107(2) have come to be denoted as “parsonage allowance.”63
For purposes of Section 107, the U.S. Tax Court has construed the
term “minister of the gospel” to include a full-time cantor in a conservative synagogue. 64 However, the Tax Court denied the parsonage allowance exclusion to a Baptist “minister of education” on the grounds that
he was not a “minister of the gospel.” 65
To qualify for the Section 107 exclusion, it is not enough that a recipient of in-kind housing or of a cash parsonage allowance be a “minister of the gospel.” In addition, the regulations construing Section 107
specify that the clerical recipient must receive his housing or cash allowance as compensation for performing services “ordinarily” associated
with a religious ministry. In particular, the Treasury regulations restrict
the Section 107 exclusion to the value of a home or a parsonage allowance which constitutes “remuneration for services which are ordinarily
the duties of a minister of the gospel.” 66 Such duties “include performance of sacerdotal functions, the conduct of religious worship, the
administration and maintenance of religious organizations and their
integral agencies, and the performance of teaching and administrative
duties at theological seminaries.” 67
Thus, for example, an ordained rabbi was denied the parsonage allowance exclusion because his service as “the national director of Interreligious Affairs for the American Jewish Committee . . . was not a ministerial function” for purposes of Section 107. 68 Similarly, a Baptist
minister employed by the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade was
denied the exclusion because “the preaching of anticommunism [is not]
the conduct of religious worship.” 69 Likewise, the Treasury regulations
conclude that a clergyman is not performing services in the exercise of
his ministry when he teaches “history and mathematics” at a secular
university. 70
In contrast, the regulations indicate that duties as a university
chaplain “which include the conduct of religious worship, offering spiritual counsel to the university students, and teaching a class in religion”
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

See, e.g., Warren v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 343, 346 (2000).
Silverman v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 727 (1972).
Lawrence v. Comm’r, 50 T.C. 494 (1968).
Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963).
Id.
Tanenbaum v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 1, 9 (1972).
Colbert v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 449, 456 (1974).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-5(c)(2) (as amended in 1968).
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constitute services in the exercise of a ministry. 71 Similarly, according to
the regulations, a minister performs services in the exercise of his ministry when he works full-time for “the N Religious Board to serve as director of one of its departments.” “The N Religious Board is an integral
agency of O, a religious organization operating under the authority of a
religious body constituting a church denomination.” 72 Moreover, a minister performs services in the exercise of his ministry when he is assigned full-time by his church “to perform advisory service to Y Company in connection with the publication of a book dealing with the
history of M’s church denomination.”73
Much of this regulatory framework implements the ministerial exemption from the self-employment tax and is incorporated by reference 74 for purposes of Section 107 and that section’s exclusion of housing and housing allowances provided to “minister[s] of the gospel.”
Consequently, if these regulations unduly entangle for purposes of Section 107, they also unconstitutionally entangle for purposes of the selfemployment tax under which these regulations are promulgated.
To be excludable from gross income under Section 107(2), a parsonage allowance must be designated as such “in an employment contract, in minutes of or in a resolution by a church or other qualified organization or in its budget, or in any other appropriate instrument
evidencing such official action.”75 In addition, the allowance must be
used “(1) for rent of a home, (2) for purchase of a home, and (3) for
expenses directly related to providing a home.”76 Outlays for “food and
servants” do not qualify for exclusion. 77 The parsonage allowance cannot “exceed the fair rental value of the home, including furnishings and
appurtenances such as a garage, plus the cost of utilities.” 78
Although housing and parsonage allowances provided to ministers
are excludable from such ministers’ gross incomes for income tax purposes, such housing and allowances are subject to the self-employment
tax. 79
In contrast to Section 107 and its exclusion for in-kind housing and
cash parsonage allowances limited to “minister[s] of the gospel,” Code

Id. § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2)(iii).
Id. § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2)(iv).
73 Id. § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2)(v).
74 Id. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963) (“In general, the rules provided in § 1.1402(c)-5
will be applicable to such determination.”).
75 Id. § 1.107-1(b) (as amended in 1963).
76 Id. § 1.107-1(c) (as amended in 1968).
77 Id.
78 I.R.C. § 107(a)(2) (2006) (as amended by the Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-181, 116 Stat. 583, generally effective for years starting on or after
January 1, 2002.)
79 Id. § 1402(a)(8) (West 2012).
71
72
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Section 119 80 provides a general income tax exclusion for housing furnished in-kind by employers to their respective employees. To qualify
for this exclusion from gross income, “lodging” must be “furnished” to
“an employee . . . by or on behalf of his employer for the convenience of
the employer.” 81 In addition, to qualify for the Section 119 exclusion,
“the employee [must be] required to accept such lodging on the business
premises of his employer as a condition of his employment.”82
Unlike Section 107, which excludes from gross income both inkind housing and cash parsonage allowances furnished to “minister[s]
of the gospel,” “Section 119 applies only to . . . lodging furnished in
kind.” 83
III. THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS OF THE FICA AND
SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAXES
The Federal Social Security system pays retirement, death, disability, and medical benefits 84 to individuals who pay the taxes financing
such benefits. 85 These benefits are funded through two federal taxes, one
levied on employees’ wages and one assessed on self-employment income.
In the case of an individual who is an employee covered by the Social Security system, the employee 86 and the employer 87 jointly pay these
taxes, commonly denoted as FICA 88 taxes. Specifically, if an individual
earns “wages” (a statutorily defined term 89) from his “employment”
(also a statutorily defined term 90), the employer withholds FICA taxes

Id. § 119(a) (2006).
Id.
82 Id. § 119(a)(2) (2006).
83 Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84 (1977) (quoting S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 4825
(1954)).
84 For a summary of the benefits paid by the Social Security system, see JONATHAN BARRY
FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 76–77, 174–75, 186–90, 247–48 (2006).
85 This is a controversial assertion today with many commentators arguing that, in practice,
FICA and self-employment taxes, borrowed by the federal Treasury, are simply used for general
government purposes. See, e.g., John Sexton, CBO Says Social Security Disability Insurance
Insolvent in Eight Years, VERUMSERUM.COM (Sept. 14, 2010, 9:35 AM), http://www.
verumserum.com/?p=17127 (“Now, I have elsewhere advocated that the ‘trust fund’ is a bogus
way to look at the Social Security issue. I still believe that to be the case. In reality, current
benefits like SSDI are coming from current workers. There really is no trust fund but the general fund.”).
86 I.R.C. § 3101 (2006).
87 Id. § 3111 (West 2012).
88 For Federal Insurance Contributions Act, the formal name of the Code provisions establishing the Social Security taxes paid by employers and employees. I.R.C. §§ 3101–3128 (2006).
89 Id. § 3121(a) (West 2012).
90 Id. § 3121(b).
80
81
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from the individual’s pay and remits to the federal government this
withheld tax, 91 along with an equal tax payment from the employer. 92
A self-employed person pays a Social Security tax mimicking the
combined FICA payments of an employee and her employer. 93 In particular, an individual who conducts a “trade or business” 94 pays a Social
Security tax on her “self-employment income.”95 The statutory rate of
this self-employment tax equals the combined FICA rates paid by employers and employees. 96
There are extensive exemptions from the FICA and selfemployment taxes for persons who oppose on religious grounds insurance programs like the Social Security system. These religious tax exemptions raise the same First Amendment entanglement issues 97 as the
income tax exclusion for housing and housing allowances paid to “minister[s] of the gospel.” 98
Section 1402(g) authorizes immunity from the federal selfemployment tax for “member[s] of a recognized religious sect” who, by
reason of their adherence to the “established tenets or teachings of such
sect,” are “conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any
private or public insurance.” 99 This exemption was adopted by Congress
in 1965 100 and requires the member claiming exemption to apply for
and prove his eligibility for the exemption. As part of the application
process, the individual claiming this exemption from the selfemployment tax must waive his eligibility for Social Security benefits. 101

Id. § 3102 (2006).
Labor economists generally agree that, for the long run, the economic incidence of the
FICA taxes paid by employers falls in significant measure upon employees in the form of lower
cash wages and less employment. See, e.g., RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 86–89 (7th ed. 2000) (“[A] comprehensive review of these studies led to at least a tentative conclusion that most of a payroll tax is
eventually shifted to wages . . . .”).
93 I.R.C. §§ 1401–1403 (West 2012).
94 Id. § 1402(a).
95 Id. § 1402(b).
96 Today, the tax rate on self-employed income equals 15.3% of which 12.4% is allocated to
the Social Security program paying retirement, death and disability benefits and 2.9% is allocated to hospital coverage, conventionally known as Medicare. I.R.C. § 1401 (2006). For FICA
purposes, the employer and employee each pay taxes on wages of 7.65% for a total of 15.3% of
the employee’s wages. The employer and the employee each pay a FICA tax of 6.2% allocated to
retirement, death and disability benefits and 1.45% for Medicare. I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3111 (West
2012).
97 However, the subsidy analysis may be different because the tax relief generated by the
religious exemptions of the FICA tax, the self-employment tax and the individual health care
mandate are offset by a corresponding loss of Social Security benefits and of health care coverage.
98 I.R.C. § 107 (2006).
99 Id. § 1402(g) (West 2012).
100 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 319(c), 79 Stat. 390, 391.
101 I.R.C. § 1402(g)(1)(B) (West 2012).
91
92
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One of the religious exemptions from the new federal health insurance
mandate incorporates Section 1402(g). 102
Section 1402(e) also excuses from the federal self-employment tax
“a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church or a
member of a religious order” or “a Christian Science practitioner” if
such minister, member or practitioner “is conscientiously opposed to,
or because of religious principles []is opposed to, the acceptance . . . of
any public insurance” and if he applies for recognition of his status as
such an opponent of public insurance. 103 Since they contribute no taxes
to the Social Security system, ministers and members of orders who
oppose “public insurance” on religious grounds do not earn Social Security benefits. 104 The regulations to which FFRF objects on entanglement
grounds are in significant measure promulgated under Section 1402(e)
and incorporated into Section 107 by reference. 105
For FICA tax purposes, the term “employment” excludes “service
performed by a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a
church in the exercise of his ministry.” 106 In addition, the term “employment” for FICA purposes excludes services performed “by a member of a religious order in the exercise of duties required by such order”
unless the order elects Social Security coverage for its members. 107
As result of these statutory provisions, clergymen who are not opposed to Social Security pay self-employment tax since, as a statutory
matter, they are not engaged in “employment” for FICA tax purposes
but are instead deemed to be conducting a “trade or business” under the
self-employment tax. 108 For these clergymen, self-employment income
includes any housing as well as cash parsonage allowances they receive. 109 Clergymen religiously opposed to Social Security pay no FICA
taxes because, as a statutory matter, they are not engaged in “employment” 110 nor do they pay self-employment taxes because of the Section
1402(e) exemption.

Id. § 5000A(d)(2)(A) (West 2012).
Id. § 1402(g) (West 2012).
104 42 U.S.C. § 411(c) (West 2012) provides that, for Social Security purposes, a minister or
member of an order exempt from self-employment taxes under I.R.C. § 1402(e) (West 2012)
does not conduct a “trade or business.” Consequently, such minister or member does not have
“net earnings from self-employment” for the calculation of Social Security benefits and thus has
no “average indexed monthly earnings” to generate Social Security benefits. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 411(a), 415(a)–(b) (West 2012).
105 Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963) (“In general, the rules provided in
§ 1.1402(c)-5 will be applicable to such determination.”).
106 I.R.C. § 3121(b)(8)(A) (West 2012).
107 Id.; see also id. § 3121(r).
108 Id. § 1402(a)(8).
109 Id.
110 Id. § 3121(b)(8)(A).
102
103
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In the wake of United States v. Lee, 111 discussed infra, 112 Congress
also exempted from FICA tax obligations employers and employees who
satisfy the terms of Section 1402(g), i.e., those who are “member[s] of a
recognized religious sect” who, by reason of their adherence to the “established tenets or teachings of such sect,” are “conscientiously opposed
to acceptance of the benefits of any private or public insurance.” 113 Like
the exemption from the self-employment tax under Section 1402(g), this
exemption from FICA tax obligations requires the sect member asserting the exemption to apply for and prove his eligibility. 114 As part of the
application process, the individual claiming this religious exemption
from FICA taxation must waive his entitlement to Social Security benefits. 115
A church or “church-controlled organization” which “is opposed
for religious reasons to the payment of the” employer’s FICA tax obligation may elect for its employees’ earnings to be treated as
nonemployment income for FICA purposes. 116 As a result of this election, such church employees are deemed for self-employment tax purposes to be conducting a “trade or business” 117 and thus owe selfemployment taxes on their earnings and accrue Social Security benefits. 118
IV. THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS OF THE FEDERAL HEALTH MANDATE
Starting in 2014, PPACA and HCERA require most U.S. residents
to carry “minimum essential” health care coverage for themselves and
their dependents. This new individual health coverage mandate 119 contains two religious exemptions. One religious exemption from the new
health mandate incorporates the self-employment tax exemption of
Section 1402(g) to excuse from the health mandate sect members opposed to insurance on religious grounds. 120 This sectarian exemption
from the individual health coverage mandate is similar to a religious

455 U.S. 252 (1982).
See infra notes 182–91 and accompanying text.
113 I.R.C. § 1402(g)(1) (West 2012).
114 Id. § 3127(b) (2006).
115 Id.
116 Id. §§ 3121(b)(8)(B), 3121(w) (West 2012).
117 Id. § 1402(c)(2)(G).
118 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1026, 404.1068(f) (2012).
119 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b),
10106(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 244, 909 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 5000A (West 2012)); Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §§ 1002, 1004, 124 Stat.
1029, 1032, 1034 (same). For discussion of the individual mandate, see Zelinsky, supra note 7.
120 I.R.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(A) (West 2012).
111
112
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exception under the Massachusetts state health law 121 that pioneered the
individual health insurance mandate.
The federal health care mandate also exempts from its coverage any
“member of a health care sharing ministry” if the members of such ministry “share a common set of ethical or religious beliefs and share medical expenses . . . in accordance with those beliefs.” 122
V. WARREN AND THE FFRF COMPLAINT
Warren v. Commissioner arose from the IRS’s insistence that a parsonage allowance was excludable from a minister’s gross income only up
to an amount equal to the fair market rental value of the minister’s
home. The annual fair market rental value of Rev. Warren’s home was
approximately $58,000. 123 Substantially more, approximately $85,000
per year, was designated and paid to him as parsonage allowance and
was actually spent on “mortgage, utilities, furnishings, landscaping, repairs, and maintenance and real property taxes and homeowner’s insurance premiums.” 124 The U.S. Tax Court held that Rev. Warren’s entire
parsonage allowance of $85,000 was excludable from his gross income.
The IRS appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
contending, as it had in the Tax Court, that Rev. Warren 125 could only
exclude from his gross income $58,000 of his parsonage allowance, reflecting the fair rental value of Rev. Warren’s home.
Circuit Judge Reinhardt ignited a political firestorm when he sua
sponte questioned Section 107’s constitutionality: “[I]t is possible that
any tax deduction that Rev. Warren receives under § 107(2) would con-

121 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 3 (2012) (exempting from the Massachusetts individual
health care mandate Massachusetts residents with “sincerely held religious beliefs” against
health insurance). See Edward A. Zelinsky, The New Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption
and Experimentation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 229, 239 (2007).
122 I.R.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(B) (West 2012).
123 Warren v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 343, 344 (2000). Warren actually involved three different
years in each of which somewhat different numbers were at stake.
124 Id. at 345.
125 Rev. Warren is a best-selling author, religious leader, and one of the ministers who led
prayer at President Obama’s inauguration. Indeed, Rev. Warren has achieved the ultimate
emblem of iconic status in American society: he has been quoted on Starbucks coffee cups.
Peter Baker, Obama Takes Oath, and Nation in Crisis Embraces the Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 2009, at A1; Damien Cave, How Breweth Java with Jesus, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, at D4;
Daniel Eisenberg & Daren Fonda, People Who Mattered 2004, TIME MAG., Dec. 27, 2004, at
116; Jonathan Mahler, The Soul of the New Exurb, N.Y. TIMES MAG., March 27, 2005, at 30, 50
(“The modern master of church growth is Rick Warren.”).
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stitute an unconstitutional windfall at the public’s expense.” 126 The resulting controversy engendered much commentary. 127
Congress responded by unanimously 128 amending Section 107(2)
to include prospectively the limit advocated by the IRS. 129 As a result,
Section 107(2) today restricts any minister’s parsonage allowance to “the
fair rental value of the [minister’s] home.” Simultaneously, Congress
declared that this rule did not apply retrospectively, i.e., did not apply in
Warren. 130
This legislation terminated the Warren litigation by making the
case moot. However, this termination came at a significant price, namely, embedding into Section 107(2) the difficult-to-administer requirement that the church, the minister, and the IRS determine “the fair rental value of the [minister’s] home.”
In large measure, the FFRF complaint reprises the central theme
advanced during the Warren litigation by the opponents of Section 107,
namely, that Section 107 unconstitutionally subvents religion. The complaint filed by FFRF asserts that Section 107 unconstitutionally “subsidize(s), promote(s), endorse(s), favor(s), and advance(s) churches, religious organizations, and ‘ministers of the gospel.’” 131
Warren v. Comm’r, 282 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002).
See, e.g., supra note 3; Ellen P. Aprill, Parsonage and Tax Policy: Rethinking the Exclusion,
96 TAX NOTES 1243 (2002); Boyd Kimball Dyer, Redefining “Minister of the Gospel” to Limit
Establishment Clause Issues, 95 TAX NOTES 1809 (2002); Eric Rakowski, Are Federal Income
Tax Preferences for Ministers’ Housing Constitutional?, 95 TAX NOTES 775 (2002).
128 J. Christine Harris, President Signs Bill Clarifying Housing Allowance for Clergy, 95 TAX
NOTES 1280 (2002).
129 Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-181, § 2(a), 116
Stat. 583, 583.
130 Id. § 2(b).
131 Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 34. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona Christian
School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011), suggests that the FFRF taxpayerplaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims in the federal courts. In Winn, a five-justice
majority held that Arizona taxpayers had no standing to mount an Establishment Clause challenge to state “tax credits for contributions to school tuition organizations, or STOs. STOs use
these contributions to provide scholarships to students attending private schools, many of
which are religious.” Id. at 1440. By denying taxpayers standing to challenge in the federal
courts tax benefits in the form of tax credits, Winn indicates that the FFRF taxpayers also lack
standing in the federal courts to challenge tax benefits in the form of the income tax exclusion
provided by I.R.C. § 107 (2006).
However, as California taxpayers, the FFRF plaintiffs have strong claims to standing to
challenge the parsonage allowance in the California courts. With minor modifications, CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE § 17131.6 (West 2012) incorporates I.R.C. § 107 and its parsonage allowance
exclusion into the California income tax. The FFRF plaintiffs, as California taxpayers, have a
robust claim to standing to challenge section 17131.6 in the California courts. Moreover, taxpayers in other states have standing to contest their respective states’ parsonage allowances.
Thus, even if the current litigation is dismissed for lack of standing in the federal courts, it is
inevitable that equivalent litigation challenging the constitutionality of the parsonage allowance
will be heard in one or more state courts.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (West 2012) authorizes actions to stop “any illegal expenditure of waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a county, town, city or
126
127
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However, in an important respect, the FFRF complaint goes beyond the subsidy argument advanced by the earlier opponents of Section 107. Pressing beyond the claim of unconstitutional subvention, the
FFRF also asserts that Section 107 causes “‘excessive entanglement’ between church and state” because “the IRS and the Treasury must make
sensitive, fact-intensive, intrusive, and subjective determinations dependent on religious criteria and inquiries” to enforce Section 107 and
its exclusion from gross income. 132 Supportive commentators bolster the
FFRF’s argument that Section 107 contravenes the First Amendment
because of the entanglement Section 107 causes between the IRS and the
religious community. 133 Part of the regulatory framework to which
FFRF and these commentators object implements one of the religious
exemptions from the self-employment tax 134 and is incorporated under
Section 107 by reference. 135

city and county.” Such actions may be maintained by citizens residing in the defendant municipality or “by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before
the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax” in such municipality. Id. While the California
statute on its face is limited to suits challenging municipal expenditures, the California courts
have interpreted the statute to authorize “taxpayer action[s] . . . against the State.” Vasquez v.
California, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701, 703 (Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he individual citizen must be able to
take the initiative through taxpayers’ suits to keep government accountable on the state as well
as on the local level.” (quoting Farley v. Cory, 144 Cal. Rptr. 923, 926 (Ct. App. 1978) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Another statutory basis for taxpayer standing in California is CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1086 (West 2012), which allows anyone who is “beneficially interested” to obtain a “writ of
mandate” when “there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of
law.” “The beneficial interest standard is so broad, even citizen or taxpayer standing may be
sufficient to obtain relief in mandamus.” Doe v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist., 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d
507, 520 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Mission Hosp. Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Shewry, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d
639, 651 (Ct. App. 2009)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
These statutes and the cases decided under them suggest that the FFRF has standing in
the California courts to mount their Establishment Clause challenge to the parsonage allowance
as incorporated into the Golden State’s income tax.
Most states have taxpayer standing rules more expansive than the federal rules. See, e.g.,
Britnell v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 374 So. 2d 282, 285 (1979) (“[A] plaintiff suing in his capacity
as a citizen and taxpayer has standing to attack the constitutionality of expenditures.”). Given
the liberal nature of most states’ taxpayer standing rules and the widespread incorporation of
federal tax provisions into the states’ respective income tax laws, it is inevitable that the constitutionality of the parsonage allowance will be litigated in one or more state courts. Thus, even if
the FFRF litigation is terminated in the federal courts, the Establishment Clause challenge it
raises to the parsonage allowance will recur in one or more state courts.
132 Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 35.
133 Robert Baty, Church Member Responds to Gompertz on Parsonage Case, 128 TAX NOTES
226 (2010) (letter to editor); Michael L. Gompertz, Lawsuit Challenges Income Tax Preferences
for Clergy, 128 TAX NOTES 81 (2010).
134 I.R.C. § 1402(e) (West 2012).
135 Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963) (“In general, the rules provided in
§ 1402(c)-5 will be applicable to such determination.”).
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VI. ENTANGLEMENT, SUBSIDIZATION, AND THE NORMATIVE TAX BASE
Walz undermines the characterization of Section 107 as a tax subsidy since it points to a plausible, nonsubsidizing rationale for Section
107, i.e., a congressional decision to choose the problems of borderline
entanglement rather than the costs of enforcement-related entanglement. The characterization of any tax provision as a subsidy is only
compelling if there is first established a normative baseline of taxation
from which that provision is deemed to subsidize. Only with such a
baseline established can the “subsidy” moniker be meaningfully applied
to provisions that deviate from that baseline. Walz suggests that a normative income tax may properly contain an exclusion like Section 107
to avoid enmeshing church and state in the inherently intrusive enforcement of the tax law. From this baseline, Section 107 is not a tax
subsidy but, rather, is part of a normative tax.
Professor Bittker cogently observed over a generation ago: “The assertion that an exemption is equivalent to a subsidy is untrue, meaningless, or circular, depending on context, unless we can agree on a ‘correct’
or ‘ideal’ or ‘normal’ taxing structure as a benchmark for which to
measure departures.” 136
Despite all of the ink which has subsequently been spilled on this
topic, 137 no one has ever refuted Professor Bittker’s insight that a tax
exemption can only be convincingly labeled as a subsidy if there is prior
agreement on the contours of a normative tax from which to measure
subsidization.
Consider, for example, the exclusion under the federal income tax
of the income from self-performed services. 138 Consider, in particular,
the failure to tax the income my neighbor generates by growing his own
tomatoes in his home garden.
Those tomatoes constitute an “economic benefit” 139 to my neighbor. He could readily realize the cash value of that benefit by selling his
tomatoes at the local farmers’ market at a not insignificant price. When
he instead eats those tomatoes, my neighbor’s consumption constitutes
Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1304 (1969).
Much of the subsequent writing in this area has occurred under the heading of tax expenditure analysis. See Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax
Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010);
Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of
Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168–70 (1993); Edward A.
Zelinsky, Winn and the Inadvisability of Constitutionalizing Tax Expenditure Analysis, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 25 (2011); Zelinsky, supra note 20, at 809–10.
138 See, e.g., MICHAEL A. LIVINGSTON & DAVID S. GAMAGE, TAXATION: LAW, PLANNING AND
POLICY 126–27 (2d ed. 2010) (“[N]o one really expects the imputed income from goods or
services to be taxed . . . .”).
139 United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1950).
136
137
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income according to the widely accepted Haig-Simons definition of
income. 140
The Internal Revenue Code confirms that “gross income means all
income from whatever source derived” 141—with no exception for homegrown tomatoes. Similarly, the leading judicial definition of income—
“accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion” 142—makes no exception for the tomatoes
raised by my neighbor.
Nevertheless, few, if any, think that my neighbor should report on
his Form 1040 the value of his homegrown tomatoes or that the IRS
should collect federal income tax on account of such tomatoes. Concerns about valuation, taxpayer liquidity, public acceptability, and enforceability 143 impel the conclusion that, notwithstanding the theoretical
argument that homegrown tomatoes generate income, the Code’s definition of income should not be pressed that far.
Does it make sense to characterize the failure to tax homegrown
tomatoes as a tax subsidy? Professor Bittker’s insight indicates “no.”
Income from self-performed services is excluded from the income tax
base, not to subsidize such services, but because such exclusion is a
proper feature of a baseline tax, considering such tax policy criteria as
taxpayer liquidity, valuation, enforceability, and public acceptability.
Only if a particular item is properly characterized as part of the normative income-tax base can its exclusion from that base be convincingly
deemed a “subsidy.”
Similarly, before Section 107 can be labeled as a tax “subsidy,” it is
necessary to agree that a normative income tax should include the value
of in-kind housing and cash housing allowances provided to “minister[s] of the gospel.” If Section 107 appropriately manages the enforcement-related entanglement of church and state, then the exclusion from
income of clerical housing and parsonage allowances, like the exclusion
of self-performed services, is part of a normative baseline tax rather than
a tax subsidy.
In contrast, Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Texas Monthly
declares that “[e]very tax exemption constitutes a subsidy” 144 and that
140 The much-celebrated Haig-Simons definition of income includes as one of its components “the market value of rights exercised in consumption.” This indicates that my neighbor
has income when he eats his homegrown tomatoes. Indeed, the Haig-Simons definition suggests that my neighbor has income as his tomatoes mature and thereby increase “the value of
the store of property rights” represented by those tomatoes. HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME
TAXATION 50 (1938). For discussion of the Haig-Simons definition of income, see WILLIAM A.
KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 48–49 (15th ed. 2009).
141 I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006).
142 Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
143 Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism and the
Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 879 (1997).
144 Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989).
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any tax exemption aimed solely at religious entities and actors unconstitutionally subvents religion. From these premises, Section 107, the religious exemptions from the individual health care mandate, and the sectarian exemptions from the self-employment and FICA taxes all
subsidize religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
VII. REPEALING SECTION 107: SWAPPING BORDERLINE ENTANGLEMENT FOR
ENFORCEMENT ENTANGLEMENT
The contemporary opponents of Section 107 argue that Section
107, rather than minimizing entanglement, itself enmeshes the federal
tax collector and religious institutions. At first blush, these opponents
marshal strong support for their concerns since policing the borders of
Section 107’s income tax exclusion involves entangling concerns about
eligibility for that exclusion. The FFRF complaint succinctly observes
that, “to administer and apply” Code Section 107, the IRS and the
Treasury must make sensitive, fact-intensive, intrusive, and subjective
determinations dependent on religious criteria and inquiries, such as
whether certain activities constitute “religious worship” or “sacerdotal
functions”; whether a member of the clergy is “duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed”; or whether a Christian college or other organization is “under the authority of” a church or denomination. These and
other determinations result in “excessive entanglement” between church
and state contrary to the Establishment Clause. 145
This is in large measure a challenge, not to Section 107 itself, but to
the Treasury regulations which implement it. The regulations are the
source of such concepts as “religious worship,” 146 “sacerdotal functions,” 147 and “duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed.” 148 However,
even if there were no regulations, defining “minister of the gospel”
would, as a statutory matter, present the kind of borderline entanglement concerns which troubled Justice Harlan and which were controlling for the Texas Monthly plurality, namely, the need to define who is
and who is not such a minister.
Thus, viewed in isolation, those who attack Section 107 on entanglement grounds mount a powerful case since difficult issues must be
resolved to police the boundaries of that provision to determine who is
eligible for that section’s income tax exclusion. However, for two reaComplaint, supra note 6, ¶ 35.
Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963).
147 Id.
148 Id. § 1.1402(c)-5(a)(2) (as amended in 1968); see also id. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in
1963) (“In general, the rules provided in § 1.1402(c)-5 will be applicable to such determination.”).
145
146
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sons, Section 107 and its borderline enforcement quandaries cannot be
viewed in isolation. First, if Section 107 is overturned by the courts (or
repealed by Congress), much housing provided to clergymen will generate taxable income to them and thus will create problems of enforcement entanglement as the IRS collects housing-related taxes from these
clergymen and the churches for which they work. Second, as I discuss in
the next Part, if Section 107 is stricken as unconstitutional, many religious institutions and clergy receiving employer-provided housing will
default to the general provisions of Section 119. 149 When this happens,
the upshot will be the borderline entanglement problems of determining
clerical employees’ eligibility for Section 119’s income tax exclusion for
employer-furnished lodging.
Consider first the possible invalidation of Section 107 as violating
the First Amendment. This would cause the federal income taxation of
many clergymen who receive currently nontaxable housing from their
churches. Taxation is inherently intrusive. It inflicts compliance costs
upon taxpayers and engenders conflict between taxpayers and the tax
collector. If, for example, the rental value of church-provided housing
must be included in a clergyman’s income, that value must be calculated, both so that the clergyman can report it on his Form 1040 and so
that the employing church can withhold the appropriate income tax
from the clergyman’s paychecks. Such rental values are not easily determined and would be a source of conflict among the IRS, the religious
institutions furnishing housing to their clerical employees, and the ministers receiving such employer-provided housing. To use Chief Justice
Burger’s formulation from Lemon, the relationship between the tax collector and the taxpayer constitutes “comprehensive, discriminating, and
continuing state surveillance.” 150
If a church does not withhold the income tax attributable to the
rental value of the lodging the church provides to its employees (or does
not withhold enough), the IRS must then enforce the wage withholding
statute 151 against the church. Ultimately, this can result in liens 152 on and
levies against153 church property. Even short of this level of conflict, if
Section 107 no longer excludes employer-provided housing from the
income of clerical employees, the IRS would need to audit churches to
confirm the accuracy of the amounts they report for their clerical employees as housing income as well as the adequacy of the church’s tax
withholding from the wages it pays.
149 Indeed, Section 119 today governs the income tax status of housing provided by religious
employers to those employees who do not qualify as “minister[s] of the gospel” for purposes of
Section 107.
150 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
151 I.R.C. §§ 3401–3406 (2006).
152 Id. §§ 6320–6327.
153 Id. §§ 6330–6344 (West 2012).
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The church-state entanglement that would arise from the taxation
of noncash, housing-based income would be particularly acute in light
of the potential valuation disputes among the IRS, religious employers,
and clerical employees (e.g., What is the fair rental value of a churchowned house?) and the fact that taxpayers receiving such noncash compensation (e.g., clergymen living in church-owned housing) may be
illiquid and thus not have the funds to pay tax on such noncash compensation. Congress has plausibly decided that these valuation and liquidity problems, while acceptable for purposes of the self-employment
tax, 154 should be avoided in the context of the income tax.
It is, in short, an illusion to believe that abolishing Section 107
would eliminate church-state entanglement. By making churchprovided housing taxable, the invalidation of Section 107 would replace
the borderline entanglement of that provision (determining who is eligible for the exclusion) with enforcement entanglement (making sure
the correct income tax is paid on clerical housing). In the taxation of the
housing furnished to clergy, it was plausible for Congress to choose the
quandaries of borderline entanglement over the prospect of enmeshing
religious institutions and their clergy in the income taxation of such
housing. In this setting, there is no disentangling alternative.
VII. SWAPPING ONE BORDERLINE ENTANGLEMENT FOR ANOTHER:
SECTION 107 V. SECTION 119
Moreover, if Section 107 were to be invalidated by the courts on
First Amendment grounds, some (perhaps much) housing provided to
clergymen would then be subject to Section 119 and its income tax exclusion for employer-provided housing. The enforcement of Section 119
entangles church and state at the borderlines as does Section 107. In
particular, Section 119 and its general lodging exclusion to sectarian
entities and individuals require four entangling inquiries to assess at the
borderlines of Section 119 whether that provision applies.
First, who is an “employee”? Section 119 and its exclusion for employer-provided housing only apply if the recipient of such housing is
an “employee.” As Professor Dyer pointed out during the Warren litigation, some clergy are employees of their congregations, others are clearly not, and yet others “fall anywhere within that broad range.” 155 Determining whether any particular clergyman is an “employee” for purposes
of Section 119 necessitates an entangling assessment of the religious
doctrine and practice of the clergyman’s particular church.
154
155

Id. §§ 1402(a)(8).
Dyer, supra note 127, at 1811.
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Second, is housing provided “for the convenience of the [religious]
employer”? Assessing this requirement of Section 119 entails examination of the policies and practices of the religious institution furnishing
housing to ascertain whether the institution provides such housing to its
clerical employee “to enable him properly to perform the duties of his
employment” 156 or, rather, to compensate such employee. This, in turn,
requires an intrusive inquiry into the purposes of those who govern the
religious employer, including possible inquisition into their internal
deliberations.
Third, what is the particular church’s “business”? Section 119 only
excludes the value of lodging employers provide on their respective
“business premises.” This element of the statute necessitates a determination of the employing church’s “business” which, in turn, requires the
IRS to assess the church’s policies and practices. Consider, for example,
the members of a religious order who live at a homeless shelter they
operate for their order. Is maintaining this shelter the order’s “business”
for purposes of Section 119?
Fourth, what are the church’s “premises”? Consider a rabbi expected to entertain his congregants on a regular basis at the home provided to him by the congregation and to hold study groups there. Is this
home the “premises” of the congregation for purposes of Section 119?
Thus, striking Section 107 under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause would not end the entangling borderline inquiries the
IRS must make of churches which provide housing to their ministers.
Rather, striking Section 107 on constitutional grounds would shift the
focus from the entangling borderline questions posed by Section 107 (Is
a clergyman a “minister of the gospel”?) to the entangling borderline
inquiries posed by Section 119 (Is a clergyman an employee? Is housing
provided for his religious employer’s convenience? Is this housing part
of the church’s “business premises”?). It is plausible for Congress to
prefer as less intrusive and more easily administered the borderline entanglement posed by Section 107 rather than the borderline entanglement posed by Section 119. Consequently, Section 107 is properly part
of a normative income tax rather than a subsidizing provision.
Michael L. Gompertz disagrees. Calling on the courts to strike Section 107 as unconstitutional, Mr. Gompertz argues that “there is usually
no business need for the minister to live on church property,” 157 that
“the requirements of section 119 would almost never be met” by clergymen, 158 and that “it would not be difficult for the IRS to determine
whether section 119 is applicable to a clergyman.” 159
156
157
158
159

Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b) (as amended in 1985).
Gompertz, supra note 133, § B.3, at 83.
Id.
Id.
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In making these assessments, Mr. Gompertz sub silentio engages in
the kind of entangling inquiries he criticizes in the context of Section
107. To determine that “there is usually no business need for the minister to live on church property,” Mr. Gompertz must define the business
of the church, must determine the needs of that business, and must decide the contours of the church’s property. These inquiries under Section 119 enmesh the church and the tax collector as much as the determination whether a clergyman is a “minister of the gospel” for purposes
of Section 107.
Confronted with these choices, Congress plausibly selected Section
107 as its preferred method of managing entanglement between church
and state in the context of housing provided to clergymen. To be sure,
that choice is neither inevitable nor does it eliminate entanglement between the IRS and religious institutions since the Section 107 exclusion
eliminates enforcement entanglement at the price of borderline entanglement. However, striking Section 107 would not eliminate entanglement between church and state either. Rather, invalidating Section 107
would, in some cases, replace entanglement at the borders of Section
107 with the enforcement-related entanglement of church and state as
the IRS would collect the income taxes attributable to clerical housing.
In other instances, repealing Section 107 would shift the enmeshing
inquiries about eligibility for exemption from the entangling inquiries
posed at the boundaries of Section 107 to the similarly entangling questions which mark the boundaries of Section 119.
VIII. A BROADER POSSIBILITY: NEITHER SECTION 107 NOR SECTION 119
APPLIES TO RELIGIOUS EMPLOYERS
This analysis raises another, broader possibility, namely, that the
Establishment Clause forbids both Section 107 and the application of
Section 119 to churches and their personnel. At first blush, such an expansive construction of the First Amendment promises to eliminate
both the entangling inquiries necessary to enforce the borders of Section
107 and the entangling inquiries needed to police eligibility for Section
119 since, under this alternative, neither provision could apply to religious employers or their personnel.
For three reasons, this approach is ultimately unsatisfactory. First,
troubling Free Exercise 160 concerns arise if Section 119 is construed as
available to all employers except religious institutions. “[T]he protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates
160 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . .”).
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against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct
because it is undertaken for religious reasons.” 161 Such discrimination
would occur in violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise clause
if Section 119 is interpreted as benefiting all employers other than religious entities.
Second, if, in a world without Section 107, the courts also declare
that Section 119 cannot apply to religious institutions and their employees or if Congress legislates to that effect, it will then be necessary to
determine which institutions and employees fall within this Section 119
ban by virtue of their sectarian nature and which do not. Again, entangling borderline inquires would arise if the IRS were required to determine which employers are religious (and thus outside the purview of
Section 119) and which are secular (and thus covered by that provision).
The prospect of eliminating church-state entanglement again proves
illusory.
Third, if neither Section 107 nor Section 119 precludes the income
taxation of the value of housing provided to clergy, then the IRS, to enforce that taxation, would be required to intrude into internal church
autonomy to ensure that ministers include in their gross incomes the
value of the housing provided to them. The upshot would be the kind of
enforcement entanglement against which Chief Justice Burger cautioned
in Walz and Lemon, i.e., continuing government intervention into internal church operations. As noted above, taxation—particularly the
taxation of hard-to-value, illiquid income provided in in-kind—is inherently intrusive.
Thus, at the end of the day, the search for disentangling tax alternatives is unavailing, both in the context of the general relationship between the modern state’s tax system and contemporary religious entities
and, more specifically, in the context of the tax treatment of clerical
housing. When taxes and churches collide, there are no disentangling
alternatives, only imperfect trade-offs between different forms of entanglement. If the current regulations under Section 107 are jettisoned, it
will then be necessary to decide at the borders of Section 107 who is a
“minister of the gospel” for purposes of that provision and who is not. If
Section 107 itself is stricken as violating the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, similar borderline issues will arise in determining if
Section 119 applies to church-provided housing. Were clerical housing
to be taxed as income, the enforcement of the Code against churches
and their employees would produce the enforcement entanglement inherent in the relationship between the tax collector and taxpayers and
would thus impair the autonomy of religious entities by intruding the
IRS into their internal operations. If neither Section 119 nor Section 107
161

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).

Zelinsky.33-4 (Do Not Delete)

2012]

RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTIONS

3/25/2012 3:35 PM

1663

excluded from clerical incomes the rental value of employer-provided
housing, there would be both enforcement entanglement (as the IRS
taxes housing provided in-kind to clergy) and borderline entanglement
(to determine which employers are secular and therefore remain covered by Section 119 and its income tax exclusion).
There is no obvious metric to determine which of these alternatives
is more or less entangling than the others. However, the two factors
cited by Chief Justice Burger in Lemon reinforce the conclusion that
Section 107 is a plausible pick from among the imperfect choices available. First, like the property tax exemption upheld in Walz, Section 107’s
exclusion for in-kind housing and cash parsonage allowances is a longestablished provision of the Code. What is now Section 107(1) was added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1921. 162 Section 107(2) was enacted
in 1954. 163 While there is no precise yardstick to determine when laws
are old enough to merit Lemon’s history-based presumption of constitutionality, Section 107 is not a recent addition to the federal tax statute.
Moreover, unlike the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania laws which
required annual appropriations from those states’ respective legislatures,
Section 107 is a classic tax provision, embedded into a permanent tax
code. 164 There is accordingly less formal 165 opportunity for religiouslydivisive legislative battles over Section 107 than there is with a prototypical spending program, dependent on annual appropriations.
Reinforcing these Lemon factors is the reality that taxing noncash
income (like clerical housing) is particularly intrusive as the IRS and
taxpayers dispute the value of such in-kind income and as the taxpayers
receiving such noncash income must find cash from other sources to
discharge their tax liabilities.
In short, Section 107 is a constitutionally permissible means of
managing the entanglement problems inherent in the income tax treatment of housing provided to “minister[s] of the gospel.” In the modern
tax setting, there is no easy way to disentangle mega-churches from
mega-governments. Section 107 is a plausible, though not an obligatory,
choice from among the imperfect alternatives available. In a world of
trade-offs, Section 107 embodies the constitutionally permissible acceptance of the problems of policing the borderlines of a tax exemption
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 213(b)(11), 42 Stat. 227, 239.
Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 32.
164 Zelinsky, supra note 21, at 400–03.
165 In practice legislatures tend to make budgeting changes at the margins, using the prior
year’s spending as an accepted baseline. The classic statement of budgetary incrementalism is
found in AARON WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 13 (1964) (“Budgeting is incremental. The largest determining factor of the size and content of this year’s budget is
last year’s budget. Most of the budget is a product of previous decisions.” (emphasis omitted)).
For Professor Wildavsky’s later comments on budgetary incrementalism, see AARON
WILDAVSKY, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 405 (1988).
162
163
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rather than embracing the enforcement entanglement inherent in taxing
the housing churches provide to their ministers.
To the contrary is Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Texas
Monthly. For Justice Brennan, any tax exemption restricted to religious
institutions or actors is a subsidy that contravenes the Establishment
Clause. From this vantage, Section 107 is an unconstitutional subvention targeted exclusively at religion.
In conventional terms, Justice Brennan’s Texas Monthly opinion is
of no precedential force since only three justices adhered to it. Rather, in
conventional terms, Justice Blackmun’s Texas Monthly concurrence
controls as “the narrowest grounds” advanced for the majority’s decision in Texas Monthly. 166 Justice Blackmun carefully described his concurrence as a “narrow resolution” of the case, focused on the availability
of the challenged sales tax exemption “exclusively to the sale of religious
publications.”167 From this limited holding, Texas Monthly is restricted
to cases involving religious publications and thus has no relevance to
Section 107 and its exclusion of clerical housing and parsonage allowances.
For two reasons, Justice Brennan’s Texas Monthly opinion should
not be dismissed in this fashion. First, Chief Justice Burger’s Walz opinion, while permitting New York to exempt religious property from taxation to avoid entangling church and state, also places New York’s exemption for religious property in the context of simultaneous
exemption for a wide range of charitable, eleemosynary, and educational
properties. We do not know if Chief Justice Burger’s five concurring
colleagues would have joined his Walz opinion without reference to that
broader context.
Second, in Texas Monthly, the dissent and the plurality opinion
each garnered the same support. Three justices read Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion in Walz as permitting exclusively religious tax
exemptions to avoid church-state entanglement while three justices
adhered to Justice Brennan’s reading of Walz as approving religious tax
exemptions only as part of broad exemptions including other charitable
and secular eleemosynary institutions.
The problem with the Texas Monthly plurality opinion is its contention that, by eliminating the Texas sales tax exemption for religious
publications, the Court abolished entanglement between church and
state. Not so. Texas Monthly merely shifted church-state entanglement
166 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments of the narrowest grounds.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United
States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 523 (2008) (“Since his vote is necessary to our judgment, and
since his opinion rests upon the narrower ground, the Court’s holding is limited accordingly.”).
167 Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 28 (1997).
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from the eligibility determinations at the borders of the sales tax exemption to enforcement entanglement as the state collected tax from religious publications. There is no obvious metric for ranking which of
these alternatives enmeshes the tax collector and religious institutions
least. This suggests that the choice is properly a legislative, rather than
judicial, task. Thus, in the final analysis, Section 107 is saved from First
Amendment challenge by Walz and Walz’s approval of religious tax
exemptions as permitted means of managing entanglement between
church and state, a plausible choice given that no disentangling alternative exists.
IX. SECTION 107(2) AS A MATTER OF TAX POLICY
That Section 107 is constitutional does not mean that Section 107 is
compelling as a matter of tax policy. In terms of tax policy, there is no
persuasive case for Section 107(2) and its exclusion of cash parsonage
allowances. In First Amendment terms, taxing cash income is less entangling than taxing in-kind compensation holding all else equal since,
when taxing cash, there are no valuation issues and the taxpayer has the
liquidity to pay the tax.
The normative 168 arguments for excluding in-kind fringe benefits
from employees’ gross incomes depend upon such tax policy criteria as
valuation, liquidity, enforcement, and public acceptability. 169 Valuing
in-kind benefits is often difficult. When a benefit is provided in-kind,
the benefit itself generates no cash for the employee to pay the tax which
would result from including the benefit in the employee’s gross income.
In light of these valuation and liquidity concerns, it may be difficult for
the IRS to enforce the income taxation of in-kind benefits. The taxation
of noncash income is poorly understood by taxpayers and often resented by them. The public acceptability of any particular tax provision is an
important consideration in a democracy whose tax system requires taxpayers to self-report their respective incomes. From a First Amendment
perspective, taxing cash compensation (like the parsonage allowance)
enmeshes the taxpayer and the tax collector less than does the taxation
of otherwise equivalent in-kind income.
While these considerations underpin the normative argument for
excluding from employees’ gross incomes the value of employerprovided housing furnished in-kind, these considerations do not justify
168 On the distinction between normative income tax provisions, designed to implement the
proper tax base, and subsidizing provisions, intended to encourage particular activities, see
Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX.
L. REV. 973, 978 (1986).
169 Zelinsky, supra note 143.
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Section 107(2) and its exclusion from gross income of cash parsonage
allowances. Such allowances raise neither valuation nor liquidity issues
since the ministers receiving such allowances are paid in cash and can
defray their tax liabilities (or have their liabilities withheld) from such
cash. It is easier for the IRS to enforce the taxation of cash income than
in-kind income. Taxing parsonage allowances would not offend the
popular intuition equating income with cash since such allowances take
the form of cash.
The historic justification for Section 107(2) was to establish tax
parity between ministers receiving tax-free housing in-kind and ministers receiving cash parsonage allowances. 170 Since the former pay no
income tax on the lodging provided to them in kind, Congress decided
in 1954 that the latter should not report as gross income the housing
provided to them in the form of cash allowances.
However, the Code does not create equivalent tax parity between
an employee who is provided tax-free housing by his employer under
Section 119 and an otherwise similar employee who is paid cash compensation and must purchase his own residential accommodations with
after-tax dollars. There is no compelling argument for establishing tax
parity among those ministers who receive in-kind housing and those
who receive cash housing allowances as the Code creates no similar parity for nonclerical employees receiving taxable cash and nontaxable employer-provided lodging.
The best retort is that repealing Section 107(2) and its income tax
exclusion for parsonage allowances will cause churches to furnish to
their clergy tax-free in-kind lodging rather than taxable cash allowances.
If Congress repeals Section 107(2), the argument goes, a church previously paying a parsonage allowance to a minister to rent his home
could, after such repeal, pay the rent itself and then provide the rented
home to the minister in-kind and income tax-free.
Such behavior is likely to occur at the margins if Congress repeals
Section 107(2). By the same token, at the margins, there are some employers which today provide housing to afford their employees the Section 119 exclusion and which would not provide that housing if Section
119 were repealed. As long as some in-kind fringe benefits are taxfavored, employers will have an incentive to offer such benefits to their
workers in lieu of cash compensation.
Ironically, the amendment to Section 107(2) that Congress adopted
in 2002 during Warren to strengthen the case for Section 107(2) had the
opposite effect. The 2002 amendment makes Section 107(2) less persuasive as a matter of tax policy by requiring the determination of “the fair
170 H. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 4040 (1954) (“Your committee has removed the discrimination
in existing law by providing that the present exclusion is to apply to rental allowances paid to
ministers to the extent used by them to rent or provide a home.”).
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rental value” of the minister’s home. This limit, now embodied in the
statute, increases the compliance costs of the church and the minister
who must ascertain this limit annually. This limit also compounds the
enforcement burden of the IRS, which, on audit, must ascertain this
limit as well. From the perspective of normative tax criteria, this increase in taxpayer compliance costs and the IRS’s enforcement burden
was an unfavorable development.
Important voices call for the amendment of Section 107(2) to place
a dollar cap on that section’s exclusion or to limit the parsonage allowance exclusion to one residence per minister. 171 Whatever the merits of
those proposed reforms, they do not address the underlying
unpersuasiveness of the parsonage allowance exclusion as a matter of
tax policy.
In short, the current exclusion from clerical gross incomes of parsonage allowances is a constitutionally permitted choice, given the
trade-offs and imperfect alternatives in this area, but is not constitutionally compelled. As a matter of tax policy, Section 107(2) is inadvisable
since parsonage allowances, paid and received in cash, pose neither valuation nor liquidity challenges for taxpayers or the tax system. 172
X. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES AND THE
INDIVIDUAL HEALTH CARE MANDATE
The constitutional controversy surrounding Section 107 has broad
implications. If Section 107 unconstitutionally entangles church and
state, so too do the two religious exemptions from the new federal individual health care mandate as do the religious exemptions from the selfemployment and FICA taxes. By the same token, if Section 107 is constitutionally permissible in light of the trade-off between borderline entanglement and enforcement entanglement, so too these other exemptions
are imperfect but constitutionally acceptable choices. The latter is the
more compelling conclusion given the absence of disentangling alternatives.
Consider first the entangling borderline inquiries required by Section 1402(g) and its sectarian exemption from the self-employment tax.
Section 1402(g) applies if an individual is “conscientiously opposed” to
171 See Grassley Staff Memo, supra note 14. at 10–15; ECFA, supra note 15; see also Driscoll
v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 557 (2010), rev’d, No. 11-12454, 2012 WL 384834 (11th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012).
172 Even if cash parsonage allowances were included in clergymen’s gross incomes, clergy
earning modest compensation would pay little or no federal income tax as a result of the standard deduction, personal exemptions and earned income credit. I.R.C. §§ 32, 63(c), 151 (West
2012).
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insurance. To so qualify, an individual must be a “member of a recognized religious sect.” The determination whether this threshold eligibility standard is met requires three borderline inquiries enmeshing the
IRS and the individual claiming this exemption: that individual’s membership status in a “sect,” the “religious” nature of the “sect” of which he
is a member, and the “recognized” status of that religious sect. Once this
threshold is crossed, eligibility for exemption under Section 1402(g)
further requires examination of the “established tenets or teachings of
such sect” as well a determination that the individual asserting exemption is “conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any
private or public insurance.”
Viewed in isolation, these inquiries (like the entangling borderline
questions raised by Section 107) enmesh along religious lines the IRS
and the individual claiming exemption from the self-employment tax
under Section 1402(g). However, at the second step of the analysis, the
dilemma of entanglement in the modern era recurs: If Section 1402(g)’s
religious exemption is stricken on First Amendment grounds or is repealed by Congress, the entangling borderline inquiries required to determine eligibility under Section 1402(g) would disappear, but would be
replaced by governmental intrusions into religious individuals’ personal
autonomy as the IRS enforces the self-employment tax against such
individuals. If the self-employment tax applies to an individual, the IRS
must audit to assess his compliance with that tax. The audit process is
inherently intrusive. If the IRS finds that an individual fails to pay the
self-employment tax, the IRS is obligated to collect the tax from this
individual and possibly to assess fines against such individual. If (absent
Section 1402(g)) an individual declines to pay the tax and fines as a matter of religious scruple, the IRS would be required to take enforcement
action against this individual’s income and assets to collect a tax that
violates this individual’s religious beliefs.
Thus, if Section 1402(g) were to be declared unconstitutional or
were to be repealed by Congress for purposes of the self-employment
tax, the IRS’s focus would, in the context of those religiously opposed to
Social Security, shift from the borderline inquiries raised by the Section
1402(g) exemption (e.g., Is an individual a “member of a recognized
religious sect”?) to the intrusions into personal autonomy that are inherent in enforcing any tax. Borderline entanglement will have been
traded for enforcement entanglement.
Similar observations about Section 1402(g) apply in the context of
the individual health care mandate that incorporates that section. Policing eligibility for this sectarian exemption from the new federal mandate
will require entangling inquiries to determine whether an individual
claiming the exemption, as a “member” of a “recognized religious sect,”
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qualifies for the exemption. 173 Absent this exemption and its borderline
entanglements, there will be church-state conflict in forcing individuals
who are religiously opposed to health insurance to carry such insurance.
If, as FFRF maintains, for Establishment Clause purposes, Section 107
requires excessive entanglement between church and state, so too this
religious exemption from the new federal health care mandate violates
the Establishment Clause insofar as that exemption incorporates Section
1402(g). For First Amendment purposes, the questions which must be
determined to assess an individual’s eligibility for mandate exemption
via Section 1402(g) are indistinguishable from the inquiries under Section 107 to which FFRF objects.
However, nullifying this mandate exemption would not eliminate
religious entanglement between the IRS and individuals who reject
health insurance on sectarian grounds. Rather, repealing this exemption
would transform the nature of such entanglement from the enmeshing
borderline inquiries necessary to determine eligibility for mandate exemption under Section 1402(g) to the intrusions necessary to enforce
the health care mandate against those religiously opposed to it.
In short, if Section 107 unconstitutionally entangles the IRS with
religious entities and actors in violation of the First Amendment, so too
does Section 1402(g), which requires similar determinations of religious
practice and belief to ascertain if that section applies. More convincingly, Section 1402(g) (both for the self-employment tax and the health care
mandate) embodies a constitutionally reasonable acceptance of the borderline entanglements of eligibility determination over enforcement
entanglements. Given the inevitable trade-offs in these areas, it is constitutional to permit (but not require) Congress to pick between the problems of enforcement entanglement and the difficulties of borderline
entanglement. There is, again, no disentangling alternative.
Similar observations pertain to Section 1402(e)’s exemption from
the self-employment tax. Section 1402(e), it will be recalled, exempts
from this tax “a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a
church or a member of a religious order” or “a Christian Science practitioner” if such minister, member or practitioner “is conscientiously opposed to, or because of religious principles []is opposed to, the acceptance . . . of any public insurance.” The IRS and those claiming
eligibility for this exemption are enmeshed in such boundary-defining
questions as the claimants’ ministerial status and the “religious principles” to which such claimants adhere. Without this exemption in the
Code, the IRS would be required to enforce the self-employment tax
against individuals despite their religious opposition to “public insur-

173

Id. § 5000A(d)(2) (West 2012) (incorporating I.R.C. § 1402(g) (West 2012)).
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ance” such as the Social Security system financed by the selfemployment tax.
Two of the regulatory provisions explicitly challenged by the FFRF
in its complaint as excessively entangling are provisions which implement the 1402(e) exemption from the self-employment tax. Specifically,
FFRF brands as unconstitutional in the context of Section 107 the need
for the IRS to determine “whether a member of the clergy is ‘duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed’” 174 as well as the need to ascertain
“whether a Christian college or other organization is ‘under the authority of’ a church or denomination.” 175
The first of these tests (“duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed”) comes from Section 1402(e) itself and is repeated in the regulations implementing that section. 176 The second of these tests (“under the
authority”) comes from the regulations implementing the Section
1402(e) exemption from the self-employment tax. 177 Both of these tests
are incorporated by reference into the regulations under Section 107. 178
If, as FFRF contends, these tests unconstitutionally entangle church and
state in the context of Section 107, they also unconstitutionally entangle
in the context of Section 1402(e), the Code provision under which these
tests are directly promulgated. By the same token, if these borderline
tests are reasonable choices in the context of Section 1402(e) (as I conclude they are), these tests are equally reasonable choices in the context
of Section 107 as, by these tests, Congress opts for the problems of borderline entanglement over enforcement entanglement.
Consider as well the other exemption from the new federal health
insurance mandate for members of a “health care sharing ministry.” 179
Under this exemption, a member of such a ministry need not carry
“minimum essential coverage” if the members of such ministry “share a
common set of ethical or religious beliefs and share medical expenses . . . in accordance with those beliefs.” 180 Paradoxically, this exemption
from the new individual health care mandate is both less and more susceptible to constitutional challenge than is the mandate exemption
which incorporates Section 1402(g).
On the one hand, the health care ministry exemption applies, not
just to ministries based on “religious beliefs,” but also to health care
ministries bottomed on “ethical,” presumably secular, “beliefs.” Thus,
this exemption looks less like the narrow Texas sales tax exemption,
Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 35.
Id. at 6–7.
176 Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-5(a)(2) (as amended in 1968).
177 Id. § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2) (as amended in 1968).
178 Id. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963) (“In general, the rules provided in § 1.1402(c)-5
will be applicable to such determination.”).
179 I.R.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(B) (West 2012).
180 Id.
174
175
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restricted to religious publications and stricken in Texas Monthly, and
resembles more the broader New York property tax exemption, available to certain secular properties and upheld in Walz.
On the other hand, the health care ministry exemption from the
federal coverage mandate is a totally new innovation to the Internal
Revenue Code and thus lacks the Lemon-based presumption of history.
The other religious exemption from the federal health care mandate
incorporates Section 1402(g), which was added to the Code in 1965. 181
Since Section 1402(g) has been part of the federal tax law for almost half
a century, it is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality by virtue of
its age. That history-based presumption should also apply to the health
mandate exemption incorporating Section 1402(g). The mandate exemption based on Section 1402(g) is an incremental extension of prior
law that acknowledges that, just as those religiously opposed to insurance are not to be required to pay the self-employment tax financing
Social Security, they should not be required to comply with the new
federal obligation to carry health insurance.
In contrast, the other mandate exemption for members of qualifying health care ministries makes no reference to Section 1402(g) or any
other prior law. Like the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes invalidated in Lemon, this mandate exemption is a totally new enactment that
enjoys no history-based presumption of constitutionality.
Hence, the broader implications of the FFRF’s constitutional challenge to Section 107(2) and the parsonage allowance established by that
section: If the FFRF is correct that that tax exclusion violates the First
Amendment by impermissibly entangling the IRS and religious institutions and personnel, so too the First Amendment proscribes the religious exemptions of the FICA and self-employment taxes as well as the
religious exemptions of the new federal health insurance mandate.
I conclude otherwise. Given the inherent trade-offs between borderline entanglement and enforcement entanglement, these religious tax
exemptions are permissible responses to the inexorable problems of
church-state entanglement under modern tax systems. However, these
exemptions are not constitutionally required. Congress can constitutionally opt for the problems of enforcement entanglement by eschewing these kinds of exemptions.
Instructive on this point is Lee. 182 Mr. Lee, a member of the Old
Order Amish religion, employed other members of his faith to work on
his farm and in his carpentry shop. 183 He did not pay the FICA tax 184

181
182
183
184

Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 319(c), 79 Stat. 390, 391.
455 U.S. 252 (1982).
Id. at 254.
Id.; see also I.R.C. § 3101 (2006).
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imposed on employers nor did he withhold the FICA tax 185 employers
are required to retain from their employees’ wages. Mr. Lee’s noncompliance with the FICA tax stemmed from his religious beliefs forbidding
participation in and the financing of public insurance like Social Security. 186
Ruling against Mr. Lee, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal “Government’s interest in assuring mandatory and continuous participation in and contribution to the social security system is very
high.” 187 That interest, the Lee Court concluded, outweighed Mr. Lee’s
offsetting interest in protecting his religious beliefs: “Because the broad
public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis
for resisting the tax.” 188
If Mr. Lee had no employees, he would have qualified for Section
1402(g) and its exemption from the self-employment tax. Section
1402(g) is a congressional “effort toward accommodation” 189 that plausibly “drew a line” 190 between, on the one hand, employers who religiously oppose Social Security but must pay FICA tax and, on the other
hand, self-employed persons who reject Social Security on religious
ground and are consequently excused from paying the self-employment
tax. Lee, written by Chief Justice Burger for himself and seven of his
colleagues, 191 follows the trail of permissive accommodation marked by
Walz. In cases like Mr. Lee’s, Congress elected not to accommodate. In
the framework of this Article, Congress elected in Mr. Lee’s case for the
problems of enforcement entanglement—making Mr. Lee pay FICA tax
for himself and his employees despite their religious objections to Social
Security—rather than the quandaries of borderline entanglement.
Subsequent to Lee, Congress reversed this choice and enacted the
religious exemption of Section 3127 192 to overturn Lee. Section 3127
now exempts from FICA taxation employers and employees described
in Section 1402(g), i.e., employers and employees who are “member[s]
of a recognized religious sect” who, by reason of their adherence to the
“established tenets or teachings of such sect,” are “conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any private or public insur-

Lee, 455 U.S. at 254; see also I.R.C. § 3111 (West 2012).
Lee, 455 U.S. at 257.
187 Id. at 258–59.
188 Id. at 260. In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990), the Court cited Lee
for the proposition that the First Amendment does not require exemption from “a neutral,
generally applicable regulatory law that compel[s] activity forbidden by an individual’s religion.”
189 Lee, 455 U.S. at 261 n.11.
190 Id. at 261.
191 Justice Stevens concurred in a separate opinion. Id. at 261.
192 I.R.C. § 3127 (West 2012).
185
186
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ance.”193 The constitutional status of Section 3127, like the constitutional status of the federal health mandate exemption incorporating Section
1402(g), depends upon the constitutional status of Section 1402(g) itself.
If Section 1402(g) entails excessive religious entanglement in violation
of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, so too does Section 3127, which incorporates Section 1402(g). If, on the other hand,
Section 1402(g) is, as I contend, a constitutionally permissible approach
given the absence of disentangling alternatives when a modern tax system interacts with the contemporary religious community, Section 3127
similarly survives First Amendment scrutiny.
Section 3127 covers situations where both an employer and her
employees object on religious grounds to Social Security. Section
3121(b)(8)(B), 194 in contrast, applies when a sectarian employer objects
to the payment of FICA taxes but the employees do not share those objections. Consequently, the employees are treated as though they are
self-employed and pay the federal self-employment tax while the employer is excused from paying the FICA taxes it would otherwise owe.
Section 3121(b)(8)(B) raises one more time the inexorable choice
between borderline entanglement and enforcement entanglement. To be
eligible for FICA tax exemption under Section 3121(b)(8)(B), an employer must be a church or “church-controlled organization” that “is
opposed for religious reasons to the payment of the” employer FICA
tax. Determining qualification for this exemption enmeshes church and
state in religiously sensitive inquiries at the boundaries of exemption: Is
a particular employer a church or “church-controlled”? Is the church’s
opposition to FICA taxation “for religious reasons”?
However, repealing Section 3121(b)(8)(B) would entangle church
and state as well. Absent Section 3121(b)(8)(B), the IRS must enforce
FICA taxation against churches doctrinally opposed to such taxation.
Again, the choice Congress confronts is between imperfect alternatives,
i.e., the enmeshment of church and state in determining qualification
for exemption or the entanglement of church and state as the IRS enforces FICA taxation against churches opposed to such taxation. In First
Amendment terms, Section 3121(b)(8)(B), like the other exemptions of
the FICA and self-employment taxes, is a reasonable, though not a
compelled, choice to incur the difficulties of patrolling the borders of
sectarian tax exemption rather than incur the costs of enforcing taxation
against those religiously opposed to it.

193
194

Id. § 1402(g).
Id. § 3121(b)(8)(B).

Zelinsky.33-4 (Do Not Delete)

1674

3/25/2012 3:35 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:4

XI. A FINAL WORD ON LEMON AND HOSANNA-TABOR
Among the important contemporary First Amendment controversies is the status of what Justice Kennedy labeled “the so-called Lemon
test.” 195 Justice Scalia, in a memorable attack on Lemon, observed that
“[t]he secret of the Lemon test’s survival, I think, is that it is so easy to
kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so,
but we can command it to return to the tomb at will.” 196 Other voices
take a different tack including my Cardozo colleague Marci Hamilton. 197
My take on this debate will, at this point, not surprise the reader:
Entanglement, one of the three Lemon factors, is not a useful criterion in
the tax context as there are no disentangling alternatives in that context.
Whatever the value in other settings of entanglement as an element of
First Amendment decision-making, entanglement provides no purchase
in evaluating tax exemptions for religious actors and institutions. The
invariable choices under a modern tax system are to tax sectarian actors
and institutions and thereby incur the problems of enforcement entanglement or to exempt such actors and institutions and thereby incur the
quandaries of borderline entanglement.
Though it is not a tax case, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC 198
graphically illustrates the trade-off between enforcement entanglement
and borderline entanglement.
In Hosanna-Tabor, a church school terminated the employment of
a teacher who had been commissioned as a minister of the church. The
minister-teacher sued the church under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). 199 The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held the church
immune from such suit pursuant to a “ministerial exception” compelled
by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. 200
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court vigorously endorses
church autonomy in the employment context: both clauses of the First
Amendment “bar the government from interfering with the decision of
a religious group to fire one of its ministers.” 201 Consequently, legislation like the Act cannot impinge on “the employment relationship beSalazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812 (2010).
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (parenthesis in original).
197 Marci A. Hamilton, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Ret.): The Endorsement Factor, 43
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 349 (2011).
198 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
199 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101–12300 (West 2012).
200 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
201 Id. at 702.
195
196
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tween a religious institution and its ministers.” 202 To hold otherwise
would permit government “interfere[nce] with the internal governance
of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those
who will personify its beliefs.” 203 To rephrase the Chief Justice’s analysis
in entanglement terms, permitting the Act to apply to the relationship
between churches and their ministers would lead to constitutionally
unacceptable enforcement entanglement between church and state as
administrative and judicial institutions enforcing the Act intrude into
churches’ “internal governance.”204
While a ministerial exception alleviates enforcement entanglement
between church and state, it necessarily creates borderline entanglement
as the exception requires the determination of who is a minister to
whom the exception applies. Here, the Court’s unanimity dissipated.
Chief Justice Roberts, for a majority of the Court, declined “to adopt a
rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.”205
In a carefully limited formulation, he declared that the teacher-minister
before the Court was a minister because of her “formal title,” 206 “the
substance reflected in that title,” 207 “her own use of that title” 208 including her claim of the parsonage allowance exclusion, 209 and “the important religious functions she performed.” 210 Concurring separately,
Justice Thomas instead proposed that, for purposes of the ministerial
exception mandated by the First Amendment, the courts should “defer
to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies
as its minister.” 211 From Justice Thomas’s vantage point, a person is a
minister for purposes of the exception if the religious organization “sincerely consider[s]” that person to be a minister. 212
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kagan, instead took “a functional
approach” 213 under which an individual’s “title is neither necessary or
sufficient” 214 to make that individual qualify for the ministerial exception. Instead, under Justice Alito’s functional approach, “ministers”
include “those who serve in positions of leadership, those who perform
important functions in worship services and in the performance of reli-

202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214

Id. at 705.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 713.
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gious ceremonies and rituals, and those who are entrusted with teaching
and conveying the tenets of the faith to the next generation.” 215
As this division of opinion indicates, determining who is a “minister” for purposes of the constitutionally compelled “ministerial exemption” will enmesh churches and the courts just as do borderline determinations of who qualifies as a minister for purposes of the parsonage
allowance exclusion. Under all three tests unveiled in Hosanna-Tabor,
there will be enmeshing inquiries at the boundaries of the ministerial
exception: What “religious functions” did the alleged minister perform?
Is the church “sincere” in its characterization of an individual as a minister? What are “positions of leadership” in a particular religious organization?
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court, by recognizing a First Amendment
ministerial exception to the ADA, elected for the judiciary to confront
these kinds of entangling questions at the borderline of the exception to
protect church autonomy from enforcement entanglement. In the modern world, there is often no disentangling alternative.
CONCLUSION
The controversy over the constitutionality of Section 107 is important and wide-ranging in its implications. If, as contemporary opponents of Section 107 argue, the income tax exclusion that section grants
to “minister[s] of the gospel” unconstitutionally entangles church and
state, so too do the equivalent religious exemptions from the new federal
health mandate and from the FICA and Social Security taxes. I ultimately conclude that this argument is unpersuasive.
In the contemporary tax context, extensive contact between tax
systems and religious institutions is inexorable, whether religious institutions and personnel are taxed or exempted. In this setting, there are
no disentangling alternatives.
If religious entities and actors are taxed, they are subjected to the
inherently intrusive relationship between the tax collector and the taxpayer. If religious entities and actors are not taxed, there are inevitable
tensions policing the boundaries of exemption. The choice between
borderline entanglement and enforcement entanglement is inherent in
the relationship between the modern state’s tax system and contemporary religious institutions and their personnel. By exempting, Congress
chooses the problems of borderline entanglement over the quandaries of
enforcement entanglement, an imperfect but plausible choice given the
inevitable trade-offs between different forms of entanglement.
215

Id. at 712.
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Consequently, Section 107 and its exclusion from gross income for
clerical recipients of in-kind housing and parsonage allowances are constitutionally permitted, though not constitutionally required, responses
to the problems of entanglement inherent in the relationship between
modern government and religion. In the case of housing provided to
clergy in-kind, the valuation and liquidity difficulties of taxing noncash
income would make the entanglement of church and state particularly
acute and make persuasive Congress’s decision in Section 107 to avoid
such entangling taxation.
Similarly, the Code’s sectarian exemptions from the individual
health coverage mandate and from the Social Security taxes are acceptable, though not obligatory, means under the First Amendment of managing the inevitable contacts and tensions between the tax system of the
contemporary state and the religious community. Through these exemptions, Congress elects borderline entanglement at the boundaries of
exemption over the enforcement entanglement which results when religious institutions and actors are taxed or when believers are required to
purchase health insurance to which they object on religious grounds.
The constitutionality of the parsonage allowance exclusion should
not be confused with the exclusion’s advisability as a matter of tax policy. Since such allowances are paid to “minister[s] of the gospel” in cash,
there is, as a matter of tax policy, no convincing reason to exclude such
allowances from ministers’ gross income as such allowances pose neither valuation difficulties nor liquidity issues for clerical taxpayers.
However, in First Amendment terms, Section 107 is a permissible constitutional choice for managing the inevitable entanglement between
church and state under modern tax systems.

